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a b s t r a c t 
Investments in abatement technology are often characterised by irreversibility and signifi- 
cant implementation lags, whereas emissions permits can be traded at any time. As such, 
abatement and emissions permit trading systems are hardly perfect substitutes. We for- 
mally study the flexibility of emissions permits and propose a unified framework to ra- 
tionalise the impact of both investment/divestment lags and irreversibility in relation to 
the price of emissions permits. Using option pricing concepts, we reformulate the tech- 
nology adoption problem in terms of the technology’s characteristics (irreversibility and 
implementation lags) and offer a conceptual quantification of the flexibility premium of 
emissions permits. 
© 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V. 
 
1. Introduction 
A cap-and-trade programme sets a maximum level of pollution – a cap – and distributes emissions permits among 
businesses that produce emissions. Currently, jurisdictions comprising 42% of global GDP have adopted (or are in the pro- 
cess of adopting) cap-and-trade programmes, covering approximately 15% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Their global 
coverage is growing as a key policy lever on the road to net-zero emissions ( ICAP, 2020 ). The chief objective of a cap-and-
trade programme is to curb emissions by encouraging businesses to adopt low-polluting technologies and to innovate, ulti- 
mately becoming more efficient ( European Commission, 2005 ). However, the literature acknowledges that currently adopted 
abatement technologies are mature, low-investment, ready to implement and easily reversible. 1 In other words, there is  The author gratefully acknowledges funding from the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment, the UK Economic and Social Re- 
search Council (ESRC) through the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, and the Climate Economics Chair. We received helpful comments from 
participants at the Bachelier, CESifo, CMS, EAERE and INREC annual conferences and seminar participants at Kings College London, LSE, Essen-Duisburg, 
Ritsumeikan, University of Tokyo, University of Zurich. The authors would like to thank Jiro Akahori, Federica Buricco, Luciano Campi, René Carmona, David 
Mauer, Yoichi Otsubo and Gianangelo Taschini for valuable insights and conversations at different stages of this project. The usual disclaimers apply. 
∗ Correspondence to: University of Edinburgh Business School 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JS United Kingdom. 
E-mail addresses: luca.taschini@ed.ac.uk , l.taschini1@lse.ac.uk 
1 Most current cap-and-trade programmes have primarily encouraged fuel-switching – switching from cheap-but-dirty coal to expensive-but-cleaner gas 
( Goulder, 2013, Schmalensee and Stavins, 2017 ). 
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currently no empirical illustration of the alternative scenario, where firms adopt innovative abatement technologies that 
require high upfront investments, have relatively long implementation lags and are difficult or very costly to reverse. A re- 
cent roadmap for decarbonisation suggests that low-carbon investment needs to increase by an order of magnitude by 2030 
( Rockstróm et al., 2017 ). Will cap-and-trade regulations spur substantial investments in advanced abatement technologies? 
This paper proposes a general model to describe and rigorously analyse how firms respond to cap-and-trade regulations 
when abatement technologies are characterised by implementation lags and irreversibility. It provides new insights for the 
role of permit markets in achieving net-zero emissions, by explicitly considering the characteristics of alternative abatement 
technologies, and contributes to the debate about which carbon price levels are consistent with climate neutrality ( Stern and
Stiglitz, 2017 and Burke et al., 2019 ). 
Empirical research has found broad support for the adoption of mature abatement technologies. The Acid Rain Program, 
a major cap-and-trade programme to control SO 2 emissions from US coal plants, encouraged firms to adopt readily avail- 
able flue-gas desulphurisation technologies – so-called scrubbers ( Calel, 2020 ). Besides accommodating scrubbers, plants also 
switched to lower-sulphur coal, a carbon management practice that is relatively easy to implement and that does not require 
upfront capital investments ( Schmalensee et al., 1998, Cicala, 2015 ). The NO X Budget Trading Program spurred the adoption
of straightforward add-on control technologies, such as selective catalytic reduction ( Fowlie et al., 2012 ). The Environmen- 
tal Protection Agency’s market-based phase-down of leaded gasoline promoted the adoption of a relatively inexpensive and 
well-known substitute technology, pentane-hexane isomerisation ( Kerr and Newell, 2003, Calel, 2020 ). Similarly, the Euro- 
pean Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the first large-scale cap-and-trade programme for carbon emissions, has 
largely encouraged low-investment cost-management strategies, such as fuel-switching. Studies have suggested that a large 
proportion of the emissions reductions under the EU ETS can be accounted for by fuel-switching in the electricity generation 
sector ( Delarue et al., 2008, Carmona et al., 2009, Delarue et al., 2010 ). By switching from dirty coal-fired generation to more
efficient gas-fired output, electricity generators improve fuel-mix efficiency and reduce the carbon-intensity of their output. 
This growing body of empirical work highlights a story of adopting mature technologies that can be implemented soon after 
the decision to invest and where the investment strategy can be reversed , for example by switching back from lower-sulphur
coal to higher-sulphur coal generation. These technologies, however, are not sufficient to deliver the transformation required 
to achieve net-zero emissions. 
Less mature technologies tend to require larger upfront capital investments, and new equipment is durable and often 
specialised. In other words, these capital investments are irreversible . Chao and Wilson (1993) are among the first to recog-
nise that, because of the risk presented by irreversible commitments, abatement technologies are not perfect substitutes 
for emissions permits in the context of cap-and-trade regulations. Emissions permit purchasing can be adapted to chang- 
ing market conditions, whereas a specific abatement technology might be under-utilised if product demand falls. Focusing 
on the SO 2 market in the US, Chao and Wilson (1993) consider the case where an SO 2 scrubber can be installed instantly
at any time, and at a constant marginal cost. Assuming future product demand is known, Chao and Wilson show that,
in equilibrium, emissions permit prices equal the marginal cost of the scrubber. This is consistent with the results of the
emissions-constrained problem originally formulated by Montgomery (1972) under certainty and extended by Cronshaw and 
Kruse (1996) , Rubin (1996) , Schennach (20 0 0) and, more recently, Carmona et al. (2009) , Kollenberg and Taschini (2016) ,
and Hitzemann and Uhrig-Homburg (2018) . In practice, however, product demand varies in response to fluctuations in the 
input and output product markets. Thus, under a more realistic framework where demand is uncertain, Chao and Wil- 
son (1993) maintain that scrubbers become imperfect substitutes for emissions permits. The rationale is quite intuitive: 
scrubbers are irreversible and durable investments, whereas emissions permits can be purchased as needed in response 
to changes in product demand. Consequently, under uncertainty, the price of emissions permits is expected to exceed the 
marginal cost of a scrubber by an amount that corresponds to what Chao and Wilson dubbed the ‘option value’, or the
reversibility optionality value of emissions permits. Effectively, the reversibility optionality represents the ability to divest , 
namely to liquidate or sell the technology. 
By the same token, reversible abatement technologies that can be instantly installed would be a perfect substitute for 
emissions permits. In practice, however, decisions to install even reversible abatement technologies are typically charac- 
terised by significant implementation lags . With a few exceptions, off-the-shelf mature abatement technologies are not im- 
mediately brought online following the decision to invest ( Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996 ). Implementation lags might have 
profound impacts on the economic viability of the abatement decision undertaken. In fact, depending on the evolution of 
the product market, the decision to invest in, or divest from, abatement (in the case of reversible strategies) might have
partially lost its economic attractiveness during the implementation lag. Thus, even reversible but non-instantaneous abate- 
ment investments are inferior substitutes for emissions permits. Crucially, abatement investments might become too costly if 
product demand falls during the implementation period, whereas emissions permit trades can be easily adjusted to market 
conditions. 2 Consequently, the total price embeds both the divestment , or reversibility , and the immediateness optionalities. 
Together they constitute a flexibility premium , which is embedded in the price of emissions permits. To sum up, a firm that is
subject to cap-and-trade is only indifferent between investing in abatement and trading emissions permits when each strat- 
egy incurs the same total costs, results in the same amount of emissions reduction and when, simultaneously, (i) technology 
divestment is possible and (ii) the abatement investment is instantaneous . 2 Most cap-and-trade programmes are characterised by a liquid market for emissions permits and virtually zero or negligible transaction costs. 
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Following Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) the basic formulation of the investment prob- 
lem under uncertainty has been extended in many different directions to account for the reversibility of the investment 
and implementation delays. Dixit (1989) uses the real options approach to examine entry and exit from a productive ac- 
tivity. Using dynamic programming, Brekke and Øksendal (1994) examine a resource extraction problem and determine the 
optimal opening and closing times. Investment lags have been incorporated into the irreversible investment framework by 
Majd and Pindyck (1987) , Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Zhou (20 0 0) , where the investment lag, called time-to-build in
this literature, captures the time between the instant the decision to invest is taken and the instant the investment decision
is implemented and starts generating new revenues. 3 Under the time-to-build scenario, the investment decision is taken at 
a specific point in time when the optimal investment threshold is reached, but the implementation occurs only after some 
time (the lag). The decision to invest might have lost its economic attractiveness by then. But in reality, a firm’s investment
decision incorporates their expectations about market conditions at the end of the implementation lag. They may reserve 
the right to withdraw the decision to invest at any time during the implementation lag, if the investment loses its attrac-
tiveness, or they may delay the decision to invest until further information is accumulated. For example, construction lags 
affect decisions around residential construction projects ( Oh and Yoon, 2020 ) and shipbuilding ( Kalouptsidi, 2014 ). 4 In other
words, the decision can be said to occur over a period of time , and depends on the economic attractiveness of that decision
remaining positive over the course of that period. This scenario is effectively represented by the Parisian constraint 5 which 
incorporates both the attractiveness element and the time span over which it must be maintained. It is used to select an
optimal dividend policy in the corporate finance literature (see Dassios and Wu, 2009 and Cheung and Wong, 2017 ), but
here, we simply apply the concept to describe the context within which the decision is taken. 
Returning to our setup, Chao and Wilson (1993) consider a cap-and-trade programme in the presence of investment 
constraints. Abatement constraints are modelled by assuming that the investment is irreversible, i.e. that divestment is not 
possible. Permits and abatement are no longer perfect substitutes and the relationship between permit prices and marginal 
abatement costs is distorted. In fact, Chao and Wilson show that the price of emissions permits can exceed the marginal
cost of abatement by an amount that captures permits’ reversibility/divestment optionality. They also show that investments 
in abatement are reduced when the uncertainty about product demand is significant. A later study by Zhao (2003) confirms
this last result in a general equilibrium framework with stochastic abatement costs. However, both these papers limit their 
analysis to irreversible and instantaneous investment decisions, a key simplification that allows them to formulate a tractable 
investment problem. 
This paper provides a significant generalisation of a firm’s investment problem with cap-and-trade regulations under 
more realistic assumptions. The economic analysis is significantly enriched as the firm now considers both a (one-time) re- 
versibility optionality and the implementation lags following the abatement investment and divestment decisions. To keep 
the model tractable, we concentrate on the main considerations discussed earlier: (1) either the technology is too spe- 
cialised and it is not possible to divest (irreversible investment) or, conversely, it is possible to liquidate the equipment
(one-time reversible investment); and (2) the timing of the implementation of the investment (or divestment) decision 
(length of implementation lags). Despite the binary alternative between irreversible and (one-time) reversible investments, 
the formulation of the decision problem under the Parisian setup appears rather complex. Yet, we are still able to provide
a remarkably tractable analysis of this problem using an intuitive decomposition of the permit price based on the flexibility 
premium. The decomposition and quantification of the flexibility premium represent an important extension to the existing 
literature, which fails to take these characteristics into account. It also offer important insights by reflecting the real-world 
trade-offs involved in existing emissions abatement options. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 proposes an intuitive decomposition of the permit price.
The model and the main results about the flexibility premium are presented in Section 3 . Section 4 provides a quantitative
illustration of the flexibility premium. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The decomposition of the permit price 
Consider an economy subject to cap-and-trade regulations which impose a cap on cumulative emissions over a pre- 
specified period, also called the programme phase. To achieve compliance and remain within the emissions limit, regulated 
firms can reduce their emissions by adopting an emissions abatement technology. Alternatively, firms can purchase the num- 
ber of permits required to offset their emissions in excess of their authorised limit. Within the canonical microeconomic 
framework ( Rubin, 1996, Schennach, 20 0 0, Kollenberg and Taschini, 2016 and Lintunen and Kuusela, 2018 ) and experimental
framework ( Stranlund et al., 2011 and references therein), these two compliance strategies are assumed to be perfect sub- 
stitutes, insofar as (i) they each generate the same total reduction in emissions at the same total cost, and, simultaneously3 With an application to portfolio divestment and resource extraction, Øksendal (2005) studies the effect of delayed information and identifies optimal 
divestment rules. The combination of investment reversibility and implementation delays has found numerous applications in economics and finance (see 
de Almeida and Zemsky, 2003, Bultan, 2005, Sødal et al., 2008, Paciorek, 2013, Bloom, 2014, Aguerrevere, 2015 ). 
4 Oh and Yoon (2020) observe that ‘forward-looking’ homebuilders consider their expected return on investment during the entire house construction 
process. Similarly, Kalouptsidi (2014) reports that construction lags and expected revenues during construction have a substantial impact on the level of 
investment in new ship construction. 
5 The Parisian constraint takes its name from the Parisian option – a specific barrier option used in finance. A complete description of the scenario is 
provided later. 
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(ii) the abatement investment is reversible and there are no implementation lags. In reality, most technologies are charac- 
terised by irreversibility and significant delays between the instant the investment decision is taken and the instant when 
the investment is implemented. 
In this paper, we depart from the assumption of perfect substitutes and examine the implications of a one-time invest- 
ment reversal (divestment) and implementation lags, thereby extending the work done by Chao and Wilson (1993) and 
Zhao (2003) who only consider the irreversible and instantaneous case. A one-time reversal is a simplified stand-in for the 
infinitely reversible case (such as fuel-switching decisions that can be reversed an infinite number of times) but it allows us
to concentrate on the contrast between reversible vs non-reversible investments. Furthermore, it is important to incorporate 
implementation lags since they affect investment and divestment timing as well as the investment value. Since emissions 
permit trading is both reversible and instantaneous, in contrast with most abatement technology, this work argues that the 
price of emissions permits should incorporate an ‘option value’ that reflects this flexibility. We dub this option value the 
flexibility premium . 
Below, we propose an intuitive representation of the flexibility premium. First, we determine the permit price that makes 
a firm indifferent between trading and abatement. Then, we evaluate the difference between the permit prices associated 
with (1) reversible and instantaneous abatement and (2) reversible and non-instantaneous abatement (the full model allow 
us to consider irreversibility as well). This difference constitutes the flexibility premium and captures both the reversibility 
and immediateness optionalities. In the next section we concentrate on the flexibility premium and propose a general ex- 
pression in terms of the ability to divest (reversibility) and implementation lags, i.e. the key parameters that characterise 
the abatement technology. 
Firm’s net operating profits We consider a firm with an abatement investment opportunity modelled as in McDonald and 
Siegel (1986) . We assume that the net operating profits (S t , t ≥ 0) are described by a one-dimensional stochastic process
which drives the entire economy. As in the real option pricing literature, we assume that S t follows a geometric Brownian
motion 
dS t 
S t 
= μdt + σdZ t , S 0 = x, 
with μ and σ constant parameters and (Z t , t ≥ 0) a standard Brownian motion. 6 To keep the model tractable, and to concen-
trate on the main considerations discussed in the Introduction, namely irreversibility and implementation lags, we assume 
that the net operating profits pre– and post-technology adoption are described by the same stochastic process. However, the 
costly adoption of the abatement technology slashes the instantaneous rate of pollution emission α to zero, where α > 0 . 7 
Finally, we consider a zero-emissions cap regulation. These two extreme model assumptions – zero post-investment emis- 
sions and zero-emissions regulations – are innocuous. They help to make our point more vividly, but these values could 
equally be set to any non-zero level within the same model without any loss of generality. 
By convention, the firm’s value V t is defined as the expected sum of the present value of future net operating profits: 
V t = E t 
[ ∫ ∞ 
t 
e −ρ(u −t) S u du 
] 
, 
where ρ is the constant discount rate. Our model specification allows us to straightforwardly obtain the dynamics of the 
firm’s value. In fact, it is simple to verify that V t satisfies the following stochastic differential equation: 
dV t 
V t 
= μdt + σdZ t , V 0 = S 0 
ρ − μ. 
Comparing compliance strategies There are two basic compliance strategies in a cap-and-trade programme, sometimes used 
in combination: abating and trading. Let us consider a programme phase [0 , T ] and two possible compliance alternatives
at time t = 0 . In the first scenario, the firm decides to undertake no technology adoption and acquire the exact number of
permits required to stay within the administered cap at the end of the regulated phase T . Analytically, we can describe this
compliance strategy as: 
V 0 − e −ρ T (αT ) P T , 
where P T is the (futures) price of emissions permits at time T . In the second scenario, we consider the case where the
regulated firm decides to invest at time s and to divest at time s ′ , with (0 < s < s ′ < T ) . We momentarily assume that these
decisions are the optimal outcome of an investment–divestment problem and let F d (V ) be the solution of this problem when
the abatement technology is reversible and characterised by a pair of implementation lags { d I ≥ 0 , d D ≥ 0 } respectively and
with d = (d I , d D ) . In particular, let F 0 (V ) be the solution of the technology adoption problem when the abatement technol-
ogy is reversible and instantaneous . In the next section we provide the complete formulation of the investment–divestment 
problem in terms of the characteristics of the available abatement technology. Returning to the second scenario, upon in- 
vestment, the instantaneous rate of emissions is slashed to zero; upon divestment, the instantaneous rate of emissions goes 6 By convention, the Brownian motion (Z t , t ≥ 0) is defined on a filtered probability space (, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P ) . 
7 At the cost of introducing yet more notation, the analysis can be extended to the case where, post-technology adoption, (i) the parameters of the 
geometric Brownian motion describing the net operating profits differ, and (ii) the new instantaneous emission rate is ˜ α ∈ [0 , α] . In both situations, the 
final decomposition of the permit price remains unaltered. In particular, under (ii), there is a change in the total amount of emissions reduction. 
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back to α. Therefore, there are αs emissions in period [0 , s ] , zero emissions in period [ s, s ′ ] and α(T − s ′ ) emissions in period
[ s ′ , T ] . The cap-and-trade regulations require a 100% reduction in emissions for the entire regulated period [0 , T ] . Therefore,
at time T , the firm acquires the number of permits required to offset the total amount of emissions. Using the new notation,
we can analytically describe this alternative compliance strategy as 
F d (V 0 ) − e −ρ T α(T − s ′ + s ) P T , 
where F d (V 0 ) is the value of firm investing at time s and divesting at time s 
′ . For the sake of simplicity, this expression
neglects the net operating profits generated between [0 , s ] and [ s ′ , T ] . This approximation does not affect the final decom-
position of the permit price and, more importantly, it is irrelevant for the flexibility premium. 
These two compliance strategies attain the same total amount of emissions reduction and 
P T = e ρ T V 0 − F 
d (V 0 ) 
α(s ′ − s ) 
is the permit price that makes total compliance costs equal. Yet, a firm is indifferent between the two alternative strategies
only when trading and abating are perfect substitutes. Here F d (V ) can represent the entire spectrum of possible abate-
ment technologies: from technologies that are reversible and instantaneous to technologies that are irreversible and non- 
instantaneous. Thus, we can rewrite the (futures) permit price at time t = 0 as the combination of two components: 
P T = e ρ T V 0 − F 
d ( V 0 ) 
αT 
= e ρ T V 0 − F 
0 ( V 0 ) 
α
(
s ’ − s 
) + e ρ T 
f l exibil ity premium ︷ ︸︸ ︷ 
F 0 ( V 0 ) − F d ( V 0 ) 
α
(
s ’ − s 
) . (1) 
We now exclusively concentrate on the second component. We exclusively consider the technology adoption decision 
problem and formulate it as an investment and divestment decision problem under a decision constraint that appropriately 
reflects irreversibility and implementation lags. This allows us to go beyond the alternative decomposition of the permit 
price and offer a conceptual quantification of the flexibility premium. 
3. The flexibility premium 
Eq. (1) offers a compact and intuitive interpretation of the flexibility premium in terms of the difference between the 
solutions of the investment decision problem under two extreme abatement technology scenarios: (1) reversible and instan- 
taneous vs (2) reversible/irreversible and non-instantaneous. 8 However, it remains unclear prima facie how each of these 
constituents (irreversibility and implementation lags) affect the magnitude of the flexibility premium. To illuminate this 
further, first we formulate a general investment–divestment problem under the associated setup that appropriately captures 
the reversibility/divestment optionality and implementation delays. Second, we unpack the flexibility premium in Eq. (1) and 
describe the cumulative effects of irreversibility and implementation lags on the premium. 
We introduce the specification for investment (divestment) costs and implementation delays as follows. If the firm de- 
cides to invest (divest), it incurs an upfront fixed cost C I ( C D ). A positive value for C D indicates a positive liquidation value of
the technology: there is a second-hand market or, equivalently, its scrap value is non-zero. A negative C D indicates that di-
vestment is costly, e.g. the firm might bear expenses associated with plant decommissioning. Furthermore, the firm can face 
investment and divestment lags; d I and d D , respectively. Such lags correspond to the delays between the moment the deci-
sion to invest or divest is taken and the instant when the investment or divestment is implemented. The proposed model is
sufficiently general to span the entire range of possible implementation lags. At one extreme, there are mature technologies 
where adoption is practically instantaneous and implementation requires very little time. In this case the lag is virtually 
zero. The only example of this in reality applies to some electricity plants that are equipped to switch from cheap-but-dirty
coal to expensive-but-cleaner gas within a matter of hours. At the other extreme, there are less mature technologies that 
require large upfront investments in durable equipment whose implementation/installation can take a very long time. The 
adoption of these technologies might involve multiple investment stages and occasional bottlenecks that further delay the 
completion of the investment. For example, the adoption of carbon capture – a technology frequently discussed for the de- 
carbonisation of energy-intensive industries like cement, oil refineries, and iron and steel – currently requires several years. 
At the same time, most of these investments in durable and expensive equipment are completely irreversible. The adoption 
of SO 2 scrubbers is a striking example. As discussed in Cicala (2015) , scrubbers are enormously expensive pieces of equip-
ment that have no second-hand market and are more costly to dismantle than to assemble. By considering finite (d D < ∞ )
and infinitely long (d D → ∞ ) divestment lags, we account for both reversible and irreversible investments, respectively. Ba- 
sically the model allows us to consider varying lengths of implementation lags { d I , d D } ∈ [0 , ∞ ] and a binary alternative
between reversible and irreversible investments. When the divestment lag is infinitely long, reversibility is not possible. 
The technology adoption problem is formulated as an investment–divestment decision problem. To handle both irre- 
versibility and implementation lags consistent with the empirical evidence and the abatement technology characteristics 8 The model allows us to consider a binary alternative between reversible and irreversible investments and varying lengths of implementation lags. 
5 
L. Taschini Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: DYNCON [m3Gsc; November 4, 2020;2:21 ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
described in the Introduction, we borrow the Parisian setup for pricing a particular kind of barrier option. 9 The Parisian
condition requires that investment (or divestment) only occurs when the net operating profits post-technology adoption 
cross a specific threshold and remain there for a specific period of time. This period corresponds to the implementation
lags d I and d D introduced earlier, whereas the specific threshold levels correspond to the optimal investment and divest- 
ment thresholds. According to the Parisian condition, the firm’s commitment to invest (divest) depends on the expectation 
that the market conditions will remain, on average, favourable (unfavourable) once the investment (divestment) decision is 
implemented (at the end of the implementation lag). In the main text we reformulate the investment–divestment decision 
problem under the Parisian setup and propose a formula for the flexibility premium. 
As in the real options literature, the value of the firm can be written as the expected sum of the investment and di-
vestment abatement opportunities. Given the investment and divestment costs, the firm maximises the present value of its 
opportunities: 
F d (V 0 ) = max 
τI <τD 
E 0 
[ 
e −ρτI (V τI − C I ) 1 { τI < ∞} + e −ρτD (C D − V τD ) 1 { τD < ∞} 
] 
, (2) 
where τI and τD represent the first instants when the firm’s value has consecutively spent a given amount of time above 
or, respectively, below a specific threshold. In other words, the Parisian condition requires that investment or divestment 
only occurs when the value of the abatement investment crosses specific investment or divestment thresholds h I or h D ,
respectively, and remains there for time period τI or τD , respectively. The investment τI and divestment τD stopping times 
which satisfy the Parisian condition are: 
τI = inf { t ≥ 0 : t − g V 0 ,h I t ≥ d I , V t ≥ h I | V 0 = v } , 
τD = inf { t ≥ τI : t − g V 0 ,h D t ≥ d D , V t ≤ h D | V 0 = v } , 
where g 
V 0 ,a 
t (V ) represents the last time the process (V t , t ≥ 0) crossed the generic threshold a and formally it is defined as
g 
V 0 ,a 
t (V ) = sup { s : s ≤ t, V t = a | V 0 = v } . For a review of key definitions and the properties of the Parisian condition, we refer
readers to the technical appendices ( Appendix A and B ). 
Because we consider the firm to exist in perpetuity, the investment or divestment decision will occur at the first in-
stant when (V t , t ≥ 0) hits some constant optimal threshold h ∗I or, respectively, h ∗D . Thus, with τI and τD stopping times
corresponding to the Parisian condition, we can rewrite the abatement technology adoption problem in terms of optimal 
investment and divestment thresholds: 
F d (V 0 ) = max 
h D ≤h I , V 0 ≤h I 
E 0 
[ 
e −ρτI (V τI − C I ) 1 { τI < ∞} + e −ρτD (C D − V τD ) 1 { τD < ∞} 
] 
, (3) 
We take advantage of some standard results in Revuz and Yor (1991) and Chesney et al. (1997b) and utilise the key results
in Costeniuc et al. (2008) to reformulate the investment–divestment decision problem (3) . The Appendix contains the key 
definitions and reproduces the main results in Costeniuc et al. (2008) required to rewrite the problem (3) in terms of the key
model parameters (the implementation lags and the investment and divestment costs) and the main decision variables (the 
investment and divestment thresholds). Below we report the final reformulation of the investment–divestment problem: 10 
F d (V 0 ) = max 
h D ≤h I , V 0 ≤h I 
(
V 0 
h I 
)
ψ 1 
φ(b 
√ 
d I ) 
φ( 
√ 
(2 ρ + b 2 ) d I ) 
{ 
h I 
φ( 
√ 
d I (σ + b)) 
φ(b 
√ 
d I ) 
− C I 
+ 
(
h I 
h D 
)
ψ 2 
φ(−
√ 
(2 ρ + b 2 ) d I ) 
φ( 
√ 
(2 ρ + b 2 ) d D ) 
φ(−b 
√ 
d D ) 
φ(b 
√ 
d I ) 
(
C D − h D 
φ(−(b + σ ) 
√ 
d D ) 
φ(−b 
√ 
d D ) 
)} 
(4) 
where, following the literature on Parisian options, the original dynamics of the firm’s net operating profits post-technology 
adoption are translated in terms of the drifted Brownian motion 
V t = V 0 e σX t , where X t = bt + Z t , and b = 
μ − σ 2 
2 
σ
. (5) 
To simplify for the sake of legibility, we adopt the following notations: 
ψ 1 = 
−b + 
√ 
2 ρ + b 2 
σ
and ψ 2 = 
−b −
√ 
2 ρ + b 2 
σ
. 
And φ is defined as: 
φ(z) = E ( exp (zx )) = 
∫ ∞ 
0 
exp (zx ) P x (dx ) . 9 The Parisian option is a barrier option in option pricing theory. It specifies that barrier activation and deactivation is conditional on the underlying 
price staying beyond the barrier for a pre-determined consecutive period of time, Chesney et al. (1997b) . 
10 For a detailed derivation of the problem reformulation, we refer interested readers to the technical appendix in Costeniuc et al. (2008) . 
6 
L. Taschini Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: DYNCON [m3Gsc; November 4, 2020;2:21 ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Costeniuc et al. (2008) offer a formal and rigorous analysis of the problem (4) . Below we reproduce the key expressions
of interest and present an analytical description of the flexibility premium in terms of the solutions of the abatement 
technology adoption problem under the two abatement technology scenarios: (1) reversible and instantaneous vs (2) re- 
versible/irreversible and non-instantaneous. 
First, we take the partial derivative with respect to h D and, solving for the critical value, we obtain the optimal divestment
threshold 
h ∗D = 
φ(−b 
√ 
d D ) 
φ(−(b + σ ) 
√ 
d D ) 
ψ 2 C D 
ψ 2 − 1 
. (6) 
When d D = 0 we reproduce the expression for the optimal instantaneous divestment threshold h ∗ND = 
ψ 2 C D 
ψ 2 −1 , which is the
result obtained by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . Noting that φ is an increasing function, it is straightforward to show that h ∗
ND 
≤
h ∗
D 
when b > 0 : divestment lags would lead one to anticipate divestment, as argued by Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and
Sødal (2006) . Increasing the second-hand market value of the abatement technology, C D > 0 , may even speed up divestment
if the liquidation of the abatement investment outstrips the sum of future net profits. 
Second, we take the partial derivative with respect to h I and, solving for the critical value, we obtain the optimal invest-
ment threshold h ∗I that corresponds to the solution of h 
∗
I = max { V 0 , x ∗} where x ∗ solves the implicit equation 
x = ψ 1 C I 
ψ 1 − 1 
φ(b 
√ 
d I ) 
φ((b + σ ) 
√ 
d I ) 
+ 
(
x 
h ∗
D 
)
ψ 2 
ψ 2 − ψ 1 
ψ 1 − 1 
φ(−
√ 
(2 ρ + b 2 ) d I ) 
φ( 
√ 
(2 ρ + b 2 ) d D ) 
φ(−b 
√ 
d D ) 
φ((b + σ ) 
√ 
d I ) 
C D 
1 − ψ 2 
. (7) 
When both d I = 0 and d D = 0 , we obtain the optimal instantaneous investment threshold h ∗NI , echoing Dixit and Pindyck’s
result for the case of an instantaneous and reversible investment problem. In particular, h ∗
NI 
solves the implicit equation 
x = ψ 1 C I 
ψ 1 − 1 
+ 
(
x 
h ∗
ND 
)
ψ 2 
ψ 2 − ψ 1 
ψ 1 − 1 
C D 
1 − ψ 2 
. 
We now have all the necessary results to analytically describe the effects of irreversibility and implementation lags on the 
flexibility premium component in Eq. (1) . We can solve the optimal investment–divestment problem under the Parisian 
setup and finally replace the generic expression of the flexibility premium with the optimal solutions of the problem when 
the investment is (1) reversible and instantaneous, F 0 
∗
(V 0 ) , and (2a) reversible and non-instantaneous or (2b) irreversible 
and non-instantaneous, F d 
∗
(V 0 ) . Again, the binary alternative of reversible vs non-reversible is attainable when the divest- 
ment lag is infinitely long. Let θ be the flexibility premium normalised for the number of permits required to offset the
total amount of emissions 
θ = F 
0 ∗(V 0 ) − F d ∗(V 0 ) 
α T 
, (8) 
where the investment and divestment lags are d I = 0 and d D = 0 for F 0 (V 0 ) and d D > 0 and d I > 0 for F d (V 0 ) . 
The expression for θ offers a conceptual description of the flexibility premium that describes how firms respond to cap- 
and-trade regulations when abatement technologies have relatively long implementation lags and are difficult and costly to 
reverse. Now that we have a unified framework to model the characteristics of the available abatement technology, the next 
section illustrates how to quantify the impact of investment lags and irreversibility on the price of emissions permits. 
4. Quantitative illustration 
In this section we employ our theoretical results to illustrate how implementation lags and irreversibility affect the mag- 
nitude of the flexibility premium, extending the results in Chao and Wilson (1993) which are limited to the irreversible and
instantaneous abatement case. To that end, we perform a numerical evaluation of the investment–divestment decision prob- 
lem where the Parisian condition simultaneously handles the timing of the implementation of the investment (instantaneous 
vs non-instantaneous) and the ability to divest (reversible vs irreversible). 
Illustration settings We first introduce the general setting of the numerical example. The firm’s value at t = 0 is set, for
normalisation, to a value V 0 = 100 . The fixed investment cost is C I = 150 , implying that the ratio of the current firm’s value
to fixed cost is 1 to 1.5. Also, we set the divestment value C D = 50 , implying the existence of a second-hand market for
the abatement technology. Finally, we set the continuously compounded rate of discount ρ = 0 . 13 , the drift rate μ = 0 . 05
and the volatility rate σ = 0 . 40 . The emission rate pre-technology adoption is α = 1 unit of emissions per unit of time (one
year, in this example). The cap-and-trade regulation specifies zero emissions within 10 years, T = 10 . Hence, the required
cumulative emissions reduction totals 10. 
The investment–divestment decision problem under the Parisian condition is sufficiently general to allow us to model the 
case where the abatement technology is (1) instantaneous and reversible, d I = d D = 0 , (2a) non-instantaneous and reversible,
d I > 0 and d D > 0 , and, finally, (2b) non-instantaneous and irreversible, d I > 0 and d D → ∞ . We first illustrate (1) and (2a)
considering different combinations of investment and divestment lags. Then, we discuss the effects on the flexibility pre- 
mium of varying investment and divestment costs and different values of the volatility of the net operating profits. This way7 
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Table 1 
Flexibility premium when ρ = 
0 . 13 , μ = 0 . 05 , σ = 0 . 40 , C D = 50 ;C I = 
150 , V 0 = 100 , α = 1 , T = 10 , s = 0 . 
d I /d D 0 2 4 
0 0 0.001 0.002 
3 0.268 0.269 0.271 
5 0.454 0.456 0.457 
Table 2 
Flexibility premium when ρ = 
0 . 13 , μ = 0 . 05 , σ = 0 . 40 , C D = 50 , C I = 
170 , V 0 = 100 , α = 1 , T = 10 , s = 0 . 
d I /d D 0 2 4 
0 0 0.001 0.002 
3 0.252 0.254 0.255 
5 0.428 0.429 0.430 
Table 3 
Flexibility premium when ρ = 
0 . 13 , μ = 0 . 05 , σ = 0 . 40 , C D = 70 , C I = 
150 , V 0 = 100 , α = 1 , T = 10 , s = 0 . 
d I /d D 0 2 4 
0 0 0.002 0.005 
3 0.262 0.270 0.272 
5 0.452 0.455 0.458 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
we model the main groups of industries currently regulated under cap-and-trade programmes: (1) those few electricity gen- 
eration industries characterised by virtually instantaneous and reversible abatement options and (2a) those energy-intensive 
industries characterised by long investment lags or (2b) irreversible investments in durable equipment. 
The investment–divestment decision problem is solved considering different pairs of investment–divestment lags: d I ∈ 
{ 0 , 3 , 5 } and d D ∈ { 0 , 2 , 4 } . The range of these intervals is sufficient to illustrate the general effect of varying degrees of
implementation lags on the flexibility premium. Table 1 reports the values of the flexibility premium for every possible 
combination. When divestment is possible and both investment and divestment are instantaneous, (d I , d D ) = (0 , 0) and the
flexibility premium is zero. At the opposite extreme, when investment and divestment each take approximately half of the 
length of the regulated phase, (d I , d D ) = (5 , 4) , the premium is in excess of 0.45 per permit. To place this number into
context, the flexibility premium corresponds to a non-negligible 4.5% of the firm’s initial value. 11 
The flexibility premium θ combines the immediateness and reversibility optionality of trading emissions permits. Intu- 
itively, the premium increases when the investment/divestment lag increases, albeit in a non-linear fashion. Importantly, the 
effect on the premium of an increasing d D is less pronounced than that of d I . The reversibility of the abatement investment
justifies this result. More importantly, it illustrates that reversibility bears a larger importance in determining the value of 
the flexibility premium and our theoretical results readily provide a quantification of this effect. 
In what follows, we study the sensitivity of the flexibility premium around different values for the investment and di- 
vestment costs, and the volatility of net operating profits. The effects of varying emission rates and lengths of the regulated
period can be trivially inferred from Eq. (8) and are therefore not discussed here. 
Investment and divestment costs The higher the investment cost C I , the higher the trigger threshold for investment. This
holds both in the case of instantaneous and non-instantaneous adoption of the abatement technology. This is the result in 
Majd and Pindyck (1987) and Dixit (1989) for the case of instantaneous investments and in Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) for
the case of delayed investments. A higher investment threshold corresponds to a lower value of the solution of the 
investment–divestment problem. Crucially, the effect of an increasing C I is more pronounced on F 
d (V 0 ) than on F 
0 (V 0 ) .
These findings provide an alternative confirmation to the numerical results in Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) . Table 2 reports
the values of the flexibility premium for C I = 170 , holding everything else constant. Overall, an increasing C I coincides with
a lower flexibility premium. The intuition behind these results is that, ceteris paribus, a higher investment cost makes the 
abatement technology adoption less attractive compared to trading permits. 
Similarly, the higher the second-hand market value of the abatement technology, the stronger the incentive to liquidate 
the investment. Table 3 reports the values of the flexibility premium for C D = 70 holding everything else constant. The
impact of varying divestment costs is however less clear-cut. An increasing C corresponds to a higher flexibility premium D 
11 To obtain this figure, first consider the number of permits required to achieve the prescribed zero emission reduction, 10 permits over the 10 −year 
phase. Hence the cumulative flexibility premium is 4.5 for a firm whose initial value is V 0 = 100 . 
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Table 4 
Optimal instantaneous irreversible investment threshold h ∗II , 
and investment h ∗I and divestment h 
∗
D threshold. The param- 
eters we used are ρ = 0 . 13 , μ = 0 . 05 , C D = 50 , C I = 150 , V 0 = 
100 , α = 1 . 
d I = d D = 3 d I = d D = 5 
σ h ∗II h 
∗
I h 
∗
D h 
∗
I h 
∗
D 
0.05 249.62 204.89 52.01 185.06 52.44 
0.06 252.08 203.29 52.50 183.18 53.14 
0.07 254.91 201.75 52.95 181.20 53.84 
0.08 258.08 200.31 53.36 179.22 54.52 
0.09 261.55 199.00 53.74 177.27 55.18 
0.1 265.32 197.80 54.08 175.37 55.83 
0.11 269.35 196.72 54.40 173.54 56.46 
0.12 273.63 195.73 54.68 171.77 57.07 
0.13 278.14 194.84 54.94 170.06 57.67 
0.14 282.87 194.02 55.18 168.41 58.25 
0.15 287.80 193.28 55.40 166.82 58.82 
0.16 292.94 192.60 55.60 165.28 59.39 
0.17 298.26 191.97 55.78 163.78 59.94 
0.18 303.76 191.38 55.96 162.33 60.49 
0.19 309.43 190.84 56.12 160.91 61.03 
0.2 315.28 190.34 56.28 159.53 61.57 
0.21 321.30 189.87 56.42 158.17 62.11 
0.22 327.48 189.43 56.56 156.85 62.65 
0.23 333.81 189.01 56.70 155.55 63.18 
0.24 340.31 188.62 56.83 154.28 63.72 
0.25 346.97 188.25 56.96 153.03 64.26 
0.26 353.78 187.90 57.08 151.80 64.80 
0.27 360.74 187.57 57.20 150.59 65.34 
0.28 367.86 187.25 57.32 149.40 65.89 
0.29 375.13 186.95 57.44 148.23 66.44 
0.3 382.55 186.66 57.56 147.07 67.00 
0.31 390.12 186.38 57.68 145.92 67.57 
0.32 397.85 186.11 57.80 144.79 68.14 
0.33 405.73 185.84 57.93 143.67 68.72 
0.34 413.76 185.58 58.05 142.55 69.30 
0.35 421.94 185.32 58.18 141.45 69.89 
0.36 430.28 185.07 58.30 140.36 70.50 
0.37 438.76 184.82 58.43 139.27 71.11 
0.38 447.40 184.57 58.57 138.18 71.73 
0.39 456.20 184.32 58.70 137.10 72.36 
0.4 465.15 184.06 58.84 136.03 73.00 
 
 
 
 
 
mainly when the length of the divestment lag exceeds the length of the investment lag ( d D = 4 , d I = 3 , flexibility premium
= 0 . 272 ). 
Uncertainty about future net operating profits We now consider the effect of uncertainty on the investment–divestment 
decision problem when the investment is instantaneous and irreversible vs non-instantaneous and reversible. 
When d I = 0 and d D → ∞ , the investment threshold becomes 
h ∗II = 
ψ 1 C I 
ψ 1 − 1 
, 
where h ∗
II 
represents the optimal investment threshold when divestment is not possible and there is no investment lag. As 
σ increases, the investment threshold h ∗II rises. The greater the uncertainty about future market conditions, the stronger 
the incentive to wait and postpone the decision. If market conditions prove unfavourable, a committed firm will regret the 
adoption of the abatement technology, while an uncommitted firm can choose to trade permits or invest at a later stage. As
reported in Table 4 , the benefit of waiting rises with uncertainty because the probability of market conditions bad enough to
prompt regret also rises with uncertainty. The opportunity cost of waiting is the foregone income post-technology adoption, 
which depends on the net operating profits during the postponement. Since the firm can adopt the irreversible technology 
immediately, the opportunity cost of a postponement is independent of uncertainty. This is consistent with the conventional 
result in real options literature when investments are irreversible and instantaneous ( Pindyck, 1988 ). 
The presence of implementation delays changes the firms choice by making the opportunity cost of waiting contingent 
on uncertainty and the length of the implementation window. With lags, the foregone income is now uncertain; it depends 
on the random path followed by net operating profits over the lag period. The firm’s choice changes even more when di-
vestment, even at a cost, is possible. Now the returns from the adoption of an abatement technology are bounded below.
This means that expected net operating profits increase with uncertainty, and therefore that the opportunity cost of waiting 9 
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Fig. 1. θD and θOI are, respectively, the flexibility premium when the investment is reversible (top graph) and irreversible (middle graph). The flexibility 
premia are computed considering different combinations of the uncertainty about future net operating profits, σ, and the investment lag, d I . The lower 
graph represents the difference between the two premia. All premia are scaled up to improve the readability of the graphs. 
 
 
 
 
now rises with uncertainty. Thus, when the investment is non-instantaneous and reversible, uncertainty may hasten invest- 
ment and divestment decisions. As reported in Table 4 , h ∗
I 
falls from 204.89 to 184.06 and h ∗
D 
climbs from 52.01 to 58.84
when d I = d D = 3 . The longer the investment/divestment lags, the stronger the effect. Therefore, by extending the model to
realistically capture both reversibility and implementation lags, the conventional findings about the effect of uncertainty on 
investments are reversed. This confirms the numerical results in Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Sødal (2006) . 
Fig. 1 graphically illustrates the combined effect of implementation lags and volatility on the flexibility premium. The 
larger σ and d I , the larger the flexibility premium. These analysis of the effect of different values of the volatility of net op-
erating profits provide an alternative qualification and extension of the results in Chao and Wilson (1993) and Zhao (2003) ,
who studied the price of permits but limited their analysis exclusively to the case of irreversible and instantaneous abate- 
ment technologies. 10 
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Irreversible investment Finally, we illustrate the non-instantaneous and irreversible abatement investment case. By letting 
d D → ∞ , we offer a general characterisation and readily quantify the ‘option value’ in Chao and Wilson (1993) , who were
the first to study the reversibility optionality embedded in the total price of emissions permits but fall short to consider the
immediateness optionality. When d D → ∞ , the investment threshold becomes 
h ∗OI = 
ψ 1 C I 
ψ 1 − 1 
φ(b 
√ 
d I ) 
φ((b + σ ) 
√ 
d I ) 
, 
where h ∗
OI 
represents the optimal investment threshold when divestment is not possible and d I is the usual investment 
lag. The lower diagram of Fig. 1 graphically illustrates the divergence between the flexibility premium associated with an 
irreversible abatement option ( θOI ) and a reversible abatement option ( θD ). The intuition behind this result is that without
reversibility, the firm must endure the potentially extremely bad market conditions that a high level of uncertainty may 
generate. As such, the associated flexibility premium must be higher, as illustrated in the lower diagram of Fig. 1 . 
The results of the quantitative illustration have two kinds of practical relevance. First, they may partly explain the em- 
pirical observation that, in most existing cap-and-trade programmes where emissions permits prices are low, all currently 
adopted abatement technology is mature, ready to implement and easily reversible or even infinitely reversible. Second, 
they suggest that for industries characterised by long investment lags or irreversible investments in durable equipment, 
achieving net-zero emissions requires permits to be in the high-price range as advocated by Stern and Stiglitz (2017) and
Burke et al. (2019) . 
5. Conclusion 
Under a cap-and-trade programme, regulated firms have two basic alternatives to achieve compliance: adoption of pol- 
lution abatement technologies or trading of emissions permits. Firms are indifferent between these compliance strategies 
when they attain the same total amount of emissions reduction and have the same total cost. Importantly, indifference re- 
quires perfect substitution. Trading is reversible and instantaneous, whereas abatement investments are often not reversible 
and the technology adoption is usually subject to implementation lags. As such, from the perspective of the regulated firms, 
trading of emissions permits is a more flexible compliance strategy since trades can be easily adjusted to changing market 
conditions. 
The academic literature has long recognised irreversibility, and recently implementation lags, to be part of the expla- 
nation for the limited adoption of less mature abatement technologies that require large upfront investments in durable 
equipment whose implementation/installation can take a very long time. This paper’s results make two important contribu- 
tions to this literature. First, we offer an intuitive decomposition of the permit price, offering a conceptual quantification of 
the embedded flexibility premium that encompasses both the reversibility and the immediateness optionalities. Second, we 
formulate a general investment–divestment problem that appropriately captures varying lengths of implementation delays 
and the ability to divest, namely investment reversibility, by adopting the Parisian setup used in option pricing. Finally, we 
illustrate how to quantify the impact of both irreversibility and implementation lags on the price of emissions permits. 
Of course, our model has been based on many simplifying assumptions such that our study focusses on only two key con-
siderations: varying lengths of implementation lags and a binary alternative between reversible and irreversible investments. 
These assumptions rest mainly on the empirical observation that available abatement options largely consist of mature tech- 
nologies that can be implemented quickly after the adoption decision, or they are irreversible and durable investments. 
The policy implications of our theoretical results and quantitative illustration are nevertheless worth discussing. Regu- 
lated industries whose investments are characterised by long implementation lags or irreversible durable equipment respond 
to cap-and-trade regulations differently. The flexibility premium increases with increasing investment–divestment lags and 
decreasing degrees of reversibility, which means that less stringent cap-and-trade regulations have smaller effects on these 
abatement technologies. These analytical and quantitative results speak directly to the debate about higher permits prices, 
advocated by Stern and Stiglitz (2017) and Burke et al. (2019) , necessary to achieve zero emissions. 
Appendix A. Definitions and results 
Taking advantage of some standard results in Revuz and Yor (1991) and Chesney et al. (1997b) and utilising the key
results in Costeniuc et al. (2008) , the appendix reconstructs the elements required to rewrite the problem (3) in terms
of the key parameters that characterise the available abatement technology (irreversibility and implementation lags) and 
describe the flexibility premium. 
We first define the Brownian meander and list some of its properties. In words, the Brownian meander is a piece of
Brownian motion that spends all its time away from its starting point. We refer to Revuz and Yor (1991) for complete
mathematical details of the Brownian meander. Then, we present the connection between the Brownian meander and the 
Parisian condition. 
Let (Z t , t ≥ 0) be a standard Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (, F , (F t ) t≥0 , P ) . For each t > 0 , we define
the random variables 
g t = sup { s : s ≤ t, Z s = 0 } , 
11 
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d t = inf { s : s ≥ t, Z s = 0 } . 
The interval (g t , d t ) is called the ‘interval of the Brownian excursion’ which straddles time t . For instant u in this interval,
sgn (Z t ) remains constant. In particular, g t represents the last time the Brownian motion crossed level 0. Recalling standard
results in Revuz and Yor (1991) and Chesney et al. (1997b) , g t is not a stopping time for the Brownian filtration (F t ) t≥0 ,
but for the slow Brownian filtration (G t ) t≥0 , which is defined by G t = F g t ∨ σ (sgn (Z t )) . The Brownian motion continuously
crosses the level 0, thus the slow Brownian filtration is a way of representing the information about (a) the last instant the
Brownian motion crossed level 0 and (b) whether it is above or below the level 0 ( Revuz and Yor, 1991 and Chesney et al.,
1997b ). 
The Brownian meander process ending at t is defined as (see Revuz and Yor, 1991 ) 
m (t) u = 
1 √ 
t − g t 
| Z g t + u (t−g t ) | , 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 . 
The process m (t) u is the non-negative and normalised Brownian excursion which straddles time t and is independent of the 
σ -field (G t ) t≥0 . When u = 1 and t = 1 , we conveniently denote m 1 = m (1) 1 . The random variable m 1 will play a central role
in the calculation of many other variables that will be introduced later on. Recalling Revuz and Yor (1991) , the distribution
of m 1 is 
P (m 1 ∈ dx ) = x exp (−1 
2 
x 2 )1 x> 0 dx, 
and the moment-generating function φ(z) is given by (see Revuz and Yor, 1991 ) 
φ(z) = E ( exp (zm 1 )) = 
∫ ∞ 
0 
x exp (zx − 1 
2 
x 2 ) dx. 
We follow in the footsteps of Costeniuc et al. (2008) , and define the first instant when the Brownian motion spends d units
of time consecutively above (or below) level 0. For d ≥ 0 , we define the random variables 
H + 
d 
= inf { t ≥ 0 : t − g t ≥ d, Z t ≥ 0 } (A.1) 
H −
d 
= inf { t ≥ 0 : t − g t ≥ d, Z t ≤ 0 } 
The variables H + 
d 
and H −
d 
are G t -stopping times and, hence, F t -stopping times (see Revuz and Yor (1991) for more details).
Using Eq. (A.1) we can easily deduce that the pairs of random variables H + 
d 
and Z H + 
d 
, and H −
d 
and Z H −
d 
, are independent. 
Chesney et al. (1997a) were the first to calculate the Laplace transform of H + 
d 
. Below we report the main results omitting
the proofs. We refer to Chesney et al. (1997a) for a formal and rigorous demonstration of the results. 
Laplace transform of H + 
d 
: Let H + 
d 
be the stopping time defined in (A.1) and φ the moment-generating function defined
in Eq. (A.1) . For any λ > 0 , 
E [ exp (−λH + 
d 
)] = 1 
φ( 
√ 
2 λd ) 
. 
The proof is based on the Azèma martingale, μt = sgn (Z t ) 
√ 
t − g t – a remarkable (G t ) martingale. The same results also hold
when H + 
d 
is replaced with H −
d 
. 
So far, we have only looked at the Brownian motion excursions above or below level 0. More generally, we can define
for any a ∈ R and any continuous stochastic process X that 
g X 0 ,a t (X ) = sup { s : s ≤ t, X 0 = X 0 , X t = a } , (A.2) 
H + 
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) = inf { t ≥ 0 : t − g X 0 ,a t ≥ d, X 0 = X 0 , X t ≥ a } , 
H −
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) = inf { t ≥ 0 : t − g X 0 ,a t ≥ d, X 0 = X 0 , X t ≤ a } 
Thus, building on the previous definitions, g 
X 0 ,a 
t (X ) represents the last time the process Xcrossed level a . As for the Brownian
motion case, g 
X 0 ,a 
t (X ) is not a stopping time for the Brownian filtration (F t ) t≥0 , but for the slow Brownian filtration (G t ) t≥0 .
The random variables H + 
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) (resp. H −
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) ) represent the first instant when the process X spends d units of time
above (or below) the level a . The variables H + 
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) and H −
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) are G t -stopping times and hence F t -stopping times.
In our notation, we indicate the starting point of the process X, the level a and the length of time d. 
While the identification of the starting point seems unnecessary, it turns out to be extremely helpful in the context of
the Parisian condition. In the context of the abatement investment discussed in the main text, the value of the reversibil-
ity/divestment and immediateness optionalities depend on the excursions of the underlying investment value above or below 
a certain barrier. The relevance and effect of a time lag between the instant the decision is taken and the instant the deci-
sion is implemented has been explored in the optimal dividend payment literature as well (see Dassios and Wu, 2009 and
Cheung and Wong, 2017 ). 
Another relevant random variable is the first hitting time of level a, which we define below: T X 0 ,a (X ) = inf { s : X 0 = X 0 , X s = a } . 
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Appendix B. Parisian condition 
According to the notation introduced in Section 3 , and considering an underlying process (V t , t ≥ 0) to ease the notation,
the investment stopping time τI which satisfies the Parisian condition corresponds to H 
+ 
(V 0 ,h I ) ,d I 
(V ) . In order to express the
divestment stopping time τD in mathematical formulas, we need to extend the definition of H 
+ 
(V 0 ,h I ) ,d I 
(V ) . Let τ be any
stopping time, a ∈ R ,X a continuous stochastic process and g X 0 ,a t (X ) as defined in Eq. (A.2) . Then 
1. the first instant after τ when process X spends d units of time above or below level a is given by the stopping time
H + ,τ
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) or H −,τ
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) , respectively 
H + ,τ
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) = inf { t ≥ τ : t − g X 0 ,a t ≥ d, X 0 = X 0 , X t ≥ a } , 
H −,τ
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) = inf { t ≥ τ : t − g X 0 ,a t ≥ d, X 0 = X 0 , X t ≤ a };
2. the first hitting time after τ of level a is the stopping time T τ
X 0 ,a 
(X ) 
T τX 0 ,a (X ) = inf { s ≥ τ : X 0 = X 0 , X s = a } . 
If X has the strong Markov property and τ is a finite stopping time, we have the following equalities in distribution 
H + ,τ
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) = H + 
(X τ ,a ) ,d 
(X ) ,H −,τ
(X 0 ,a ) ,d 
(X ) = H −
(X τ ,a ) ,d 
(X ) , and T τ
X 0 ,a 
(X ) = T X τ ,a (X ) . Using these results, Costeniuc et al. (2008) can
state the expression of the stopping times τI and τD which satisfy the Parisian condition. Below, we reproduce the key 
expression of interest and refer to Costeniuc et al. (2008) for a detailed derivation of the decomposition of the divestment
Parisian time. 
Stopping times and the Parisian condition: Let τI and τD be the stopping times corresponding to the Parisian condition 
with time windows d I ,d D and levels h I ,h D respectively. Then the following equalities hold 
τI = H + (V 0 ,h I ) ,d I (V ) , τD = H 
−,τI 
(V 0 ,h D ) ,d D 
(V ) . 
Otherwise, in terms of the drifted Brownian motion, the Parisian stopping times are 
τI = H + (V 0 ,h I ) ,d I (V ) = H 
+ 
(l 0 ,l I ) ,d I 
(X ) , where l 0 = 0 , and l I = 1 
σ
log 
(
h I 
V 0 
)
, 
and 
τD = H −,τI (V 0 ,h D ) ,d D (V ) = H 
−,τI 
(l 0 ,l D ) ,d D 
(X ) , where l 0 = 0 , and l D = 1 
σ
log 
(
h D 
V 0 
)
. 
Decomposition of divestment Parisian time: Let τ be any finite stopping time such that τ and V τ are independent, and 
assume h D ≤ V τ a.s. Then the following equality in distribution holds 
H −,τ
(V 0 ,h D ) ,d D 
(V ) = τ + T V τ ,h D (V ) + H −(h D ,h D ) ,d D (V ) , 
and the terms of the sum are independent. A similar relationship holds for H + ,τ
(V 0 ,h I ) ,d I 
(V ) if we assume V τ ≤ h I a.s. 
Appendix C. Reformulation of the investment–divestment problem 
To obtain the optimal investment and divestment thresholds in analytic form, Costeniuc et al. (2008) calculate all terms 
that enter into the maximisation problem. Below we report the key expressions that allow us to rewrite the problem (3) in
terms of the key model parameters (the implementation lags and the investment and divestment costs) and the main deci- 
sion variables (the investment and divestment thresholds). 
We first introduce the Parisian investment time, 
E P ∗
[ 
e −λτI 
] 
= 
(
V 0 
h I 
) √ 
2 λ
σ
1 
φ( 
√ 
2 λd I ) 
, 
the moment-generating function for the process X t defined in (5) , stopped at the Parisian investment time 
E P ∗
[ 
e −λX τI 
] 
= 
(
h I 
V 0 
)
− λσ φ(−λ
√ 
d I ) , 
and the first hitting time of X starting at the Parisian investment time 
E P ∗
[ 
e 
−λT (X τI ,l D ) (X ) 
] 
= 
(
h D 
h I 
) √ 
2 λ
σ φ(−
√ 
2 λd I ) . 
We now consider the divestment action and introduce the Parisian divestment time 
E P ∗
[ 
e −λτD 
] 
= E P ∗
[ 
e −λτI 
] φ(−√ 2 λd I ) 
φ( 
√ 
2 λd D ) 
(
h D 
h I 
) √ 
2 λ
σ , 13 
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the moment-generating function for the process X t defined in (5) , stopped at the Parisian divestment time 
E P ∗
[ 
e −λX τD 
] 
= 
(
h D 
V 0 
)
− λσ φ(λ
√ 
d D ) . 
Equipped with these expressions, we can rewrite the first term appearing in the investment–divestment problem (3) as: 
E P 
[ 
e −ρτI (V τI − C I )1 { τI < ∞} 
] 
= E P ∗
[ 
e −(ρ+ 
b 2 
2 ) τI 
] (
h I 
V 0 
)
b 
σ φ(b 
√ 
d I ) ×
×
{ 
h I 
φ( 
√ 
d I (σ + b)) 
φ(b 
√ 
d I ) 
− C I 
} 
. 
Similarly, we can rewrite the second term in (3) as: 
E P 
[ 
e −ρτD (C D − V τD )1 { τD < ∞} 
] 
= E P ∗
[ 
e −(ρ+ 
b 2 
2 ) τI 
] (
h I 
V 0 
)
b 
σ
(
h I 
h D 
)
−b−
√ 
2 ρ+ b 2 
σ ×
×φ(−
√ 
(2 ρ + b 2 ) d I ) 
φ( 
√ 
(2 ρ + b 2 ) d D ) 
φ(−b 
√ 
d D ) 
{ 
C D − h D 
φ(−(b + σ ) 
√ 
d D ) 
φ(−b 
√ 
d D ) 
} 
. 
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